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Abstract Paradoxes of game-theoretic reasoning have played an important
role in spurring developments in interactive epistemology, the area in game
theory that studies the role of the players’ beliefs, knowledge, etc. This paper
describes two such paradoxes – one concerning backward induction, the other
iterated weak dominance. We start with the basic epistemic condition of
“rationality and common belief of rationality” in a game, describe various
‘refinements’ of this condition that have been proposed, and explain how these
refinements resolve the two paradoxes. We will see that a unified epistemic
picture of game theory emerges. We end with some new foundational questions
uncovered by the epistemic program.
1 Introduction
The word “paradox” means, literally, “beyond belief.” So it seems fitting to use
the word to describe some problems that have stimulated much recent work in
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the epistemology of games, which is the study of the role of the players’ beliefs,
knowledge, etc. in games.
Rapaport (1967, p. 50) writes about the productive role paradoxes can play:
“Whenever, in any discipline, we discover a problem that cannot be solved
within the conceptual framework that supposedly should apply, we experience
shock. The shock may compel us to discard the old framework and adopt a new
one.”1 The goal of this survey is to suggest that, as an example of this effect,
game-theoretic paradoxes have helped prompt the development of new ideas
in the foundations of game theory.
2 Two paradoxes
We will look at two paradoxes in game theory—one in the tree and one in the
matrix.
The paradox in the tree concerns backward induction (BI). The reasoning
behind BI seems clear. If Ann, the last player to move, is rational, she will
make the BI choice. If Bob, the second-to-last player to move, is rational and
thinks Ann is rational, he will make the choice that is maximal given that Ann
makes the BI choice – i.e., he too will make the BI choice. And so on back in
the tree. But as many people have pointed out, this reasoning is flawed. For
example, BI applied to Centipede (Rosenthal 1981) says the first player will
end the game immediately. In their textbook Mas-Colell et al. (1995, p. 282),
explain the problem with this conclusion:
Consider player 1’s initial decision to say “stop.” For this to be rational, player 1 must be
pretty sure that if instead she says “continue,” player 2 will say “stop” at her first turn.
Indeed, “continue” would be better for player 1 as long as she could be sure that player
2 would say “continue” at her next move. Why might player 2 respond to player 1 saying
“continue” by also saying “continue”?... [Because] once she sees that player 1 has chosen
“continue”–an event that should never happen...–she might entertain the possibility that
player 1 is not rational.... If, as a result, she thinks that player 1 would say “continue” at
her next move if given the chance, then player 2 would want to say “continue” herself.
Just what argument does lead to BI? Equally, if the BI path isn’t played, what
assumptions don’t then hold? This has been a big puzzle in game theory.
The second puzzle is in the matrix and concerns weak dominance – spe-
cifically, iterated weak dominance (iterated admissibility, or IA). IA is an old
concept in game theory, going back at least to Gale (1953). Like BI, it is a
powerful solution concept, delivering sharp answers in many games. Also like
BI, the reasoning behind IA seems clear. Suppose Ann is rational in the sense
that she avoids any inadmissible strategies. If Ann thinks Bob is rational in the
same way, she can eliminate from consideration any of Bob’s strategies that
are inadmissible. So, if Ann is rational and thinks Bob is rational, she should
choose only a strategy that is admissible in the submatrix that results after
1 Both the literal meaning of “paradox” above and this quote are in Barrow (1998, p. 12).
The power of paradox 467
deleting Bob’s inadmissible strategies. And so on until reaching the IA set. But
this reasoning is flawed, too. Mas-Colell et al. (1995, p. 240) state the problem:
[T]he argument for deletion of a weakly dominated strategy for player i is that he con-
templates the possibility that every strategy combination of his rivals occurs with positive
probability. However, this hypothesis clashes with the logic of iterated deletion, which
assumes, precisely, that eliminated strategies are not expected to occur.
Can a sound argument be made for IA? This is a second big puzzle in game
theory.
These two puzzles – or paradoxes – are really both about the fundamental
problem of what it means to say that the players in a game are rational, each
thinks the other players are rational, etc. The meaning of this has to be under-
stood both in the matrix and in the tree. That is why there are two paradoxes.
3 Overview
Influential early papers on the BI paradox include Binmore (1987), Bicchieri
(1988; 1989), Basu (1990), Bonanno (1991), and Reny (1992). Samuelson
(1992) and Börgers and Samuelson (1992) are important papers pointing out
the difficulties with IA. In this survey, we will focus on some of the recent
epistemic literature on these topics.
The hallmark of the epistemic approach to game theory is that it adds to the
traditional description of a game a mathematical language for talking about the
rationality or irrationality of the players, their beliefs or knowledge, and related
ideas. As such, the approach sounds tailor-made to address the paradoxes.
We will see, though, that several challenges have to be overcome to get
languages that can express the issues well. In the next section, we lay out a
very basic epistemic framework that can be used to analyze game matrices and
ordinary (strong) dominance. We will examine the problems that arise in trying
to extend the framework to deal with the tree, or with weak dominance in the
matrix, and look at how to overcome these problems. With this background,
we will be ready to follow the stories of tackling BI and IA, respectively. We
will find resolutions of the two paradoxes. But there will also be some surprises
along the way—some new challenges and even theoretical limits in game theory
will emerge.
Of course, this paper is not a substitute for the technical papers in the field. It
is a partial survey that tries to pull together some of the recent epistemic work.
4 Epistemic analysis
The first step in the epistemic approach to game theory is to enrich the classi-
cal description of a game by adding sets of types for each of the players. The
apparatus of types goes back to Harsanyi (1967–1968), who introduced it as
a way to talk formally about the players’ beliefs about the payoffs in a game,
their beliefs about other players’ beliefs about the payoffs, and so on. But the
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technique is equally useful to talk about uncertainty about the actual play of
the game, either separate from or in addition to uncertainty about the structure
of the game. A feature of the epistemic approach is putting these two sources
of uncertainty on an equal footing.2
Wewill give a definition of a type structure as commonly used in the epistemic
literature, and an example of its use.
Fix an n-player finite strategic-form game 〈S1, . . . Sn,π1, . . . ,πn〉. Some nota-
tion: Given sets X1, . . . ,Xn, let X = ×ni=1Xi and X−i = ×j =iXj. Also, given
a compact metrizable space , write M () for the space of all Borel prob-
ability measures on  , where M () is endowed with the topology of weak
convergence (and so is again compact metrizable).
Definition 4.1 An (S1, . . . ,Sn)-based type structure is a structure
〈S1, . . . ,Sn;T1, . . . ,Tn; λ1, . . . , λn〉,
where each Ti is a compact metrizable space, and each λi : Ti → M(S−i × T−i)
is continuous. Members of Ti are called types for player i. Members of S×T are
called states (of the world).
A particular state (s1, t1, . . . , sn, tn) describes the strategy chosen by each
player, and also each player’s type. Moreover, a type ti for player i induces a
probability measure on the strategies that the players j = i can choose. (Go
from Ti to M(S−i × T−i) and marginalize to M(S−i).) Call this player i’s first-
order belief. Type ti also induces a probability measure on the strategies and
first-order beliefs of the players j = i. (Go from Ti to M(S−i × T−i), and then
to M(S−i ××j =iM(S−j ×T−j)) to M(S−i ××j =iM(S−j)) via image measures.)
Call this player i’s second-order belief. Continuing inductively, we see that a
state (s1, t1, . . . , sn, tn) describes not just the strategies the players choose, but
also each player’s entire hierarchy of beliefs about the strategies chosen, about
other players’ beliefs about this, and so on. This richer description is the starting
point of the epistemic approach.3
Example 4.1 (ACoordinationGame) Consider the coordination game in Fig. 1
(where Ann chooses the row and Bob the column), and the associated type
structure in Fig. 2.4
There are two types ta,ua for Ann, and two types tb,ub for Bob. The mea-
sure associated with each type is as shown. (For example, Ann’s type ta assigns
probability 1/2 to each of Bob’s strategy-type pairs (R, tb) and (R,ub).) Fix the
state (D, ta,R, tb) . At this state, Ann plays D and Bob plays R. Ann is ‘correct’
about Bob’s strategy. (Her type ta assigns probability 1 to Bob’s playing R.)
2 Harsanyi argued that all uncertainty about the structure of the game – whether about payoffs,
the strategy sets available to the players, etc. – could be captured via payoff uncertainty. See Hu
and Stuart (2001) for a formal treatment of this.
3 Here we use types to describe uncertainty about the play of the game, not the structure of the
game.
4 Similar to an example in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995, pp. 1166–1167).
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Likewise, Bob is correct about Ann’s strategy. Ann, though, thinks it possible
Bob is wrong about her strategy. (Her type assigns probability 1/2 to type ub for
Bob, which assigns probability 1/2 to Ann’s playing U, not D.) Again, likewise
with Bob.
What about the rationality or irrationality of the players? At state (D, ta,R,
tb), Ann is rational. Her strategy maximizes her expected payoff, given her
first-order belief (which assigns probability 1 to R). Likewise, Bob is rational.
Ann, though, thinks it possible Bob is irrational. (She assigns probability 1/2 to
(R,ub). With type ub, Bob gets a higher expected payoff from L than R.) The
situation with Bob is again similar.
Summing up, the example is a description of a game situation – a type struc-
ture is a descriptive not a predictive tool. Note, too, that the example includes
both rationality and irrationality, and also allows for ‘incorrect’ as well as ‘cor-
rect’ beliefs (e.g., Ann thinks it possible Bob is irrational, though in fact he
isn’t). These are typical features of the epistemic approach.
A major use of type structures is to identify conditions on the players’ ratio-
nality, beliefs, etc. that yield various solution concepts. A basic result is on
iteratively undominated (IU) strategies. (Delete from the matrix all strongly
dominated strategies, then delete all strategies that become strongly dominated
in the resulting submatrix, and so on until no further deletion is possible.) Pre-
sumably, a rational player i won’t play a strongly dominated strategy. Also, if
player i assigns probability 1 to the rationality of the other players, then i’s mar-
ginal on the other players’ strategies will assign probability 1 to undominated
strategies. So, a player who is rational and believes the other players are rational
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won’t play a strategy that becomes dominated after the first round of deletions.
And so on.
The idea of this argument is very easy. But for all the terms to be for-
mally defined, the type structure apparatus is needed. First, rationality. This is
a property of strategy-type pairs. Say (si, ti) is rational if si maximizes player i’s
expected payoff under the marginal on S−i of the measure λi(ti).
Say type ti for player i believes an event E ⊆ S−i × T−i if λi(ti)(E) = 1, and
write
Bi(E) = {ti ∈ Ti : ti believes E}.
Now, for each player i, let Ri1 be the set of all rational pairs (s
i, ti), and for
m > 0 define Rim inductively by
Rim+1 = Rim ∩ [Si × Bi(R−im )].
Definition 4.2 If (s1, t1, . . . , sn, tn) ∈ Rm+1, say there is rationality andmth-order
belief of rationality (RmBR) at this state. If (s1, t1, . . . , sn, tn) ∈ ⋂∞m=1 Rm, say
there is rationality and common belief of rationality (RCBR) at this state.
With these definitions, one can show: Fix a type structure and a state
(s1, t1, . . . , sn, tn) at which there is RCBR. Then the strategy profile (s1, . . . , sn)
is IU. Conversely, fix an IU profile (s1, . . . , sn). There is a type structure and a
state (s1, t1, . . . , sn, tn) at which there is RCBR.
Results like this can be found in the early literature (Brandenburger and
Dekel 1987; Tan and Werlang 1988).5 Again, the idea of it is clear without
any formal apparatus. But formalizing epistemic arguments was a crucial step
towards solving the harder problems that came later, as we will see.
Other early epistemic results included conditions for correlated equilibrium
(Aumann 1987) and Nash equilibrium (Aumann and Brandenburger 1995).
One more comment on type structures: Naturally, we can ask whether Defi-
nition 4.1 above is to be taken as primitive or derived. Arguably, hierarchies of
beliefs are the primitive, and types are simply a convenient tool for the analyst.
Perhaps also, a more primitive way of describing the players’ reasoning is via
mathematical logic, and a structure such as Definition 4.1 should be derived
from such a starting point. See the papers in Special Issue on Interactive Episte-
mology (this journal 1999) and the references there for more on this. Here, we
will stay one level above these foundational questions and take type structures
as given. (But we will look a bit deeper in Sect. 11.)
5 Bernheim (1987) and Pearce (1984) introduced the “rationalizable” strategies (which differ from
the IU strategies by virtue of an independence requirement), and argued verbally that they will
be played under common knowledge of rationality (and independence). See Sect. 13 below on the
knowledge vs. belief distinction.
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5 Two problems
Two big challenges arise in developing these epistemic tools to a point where we
can analyze our starting paradoxes and many other issues in game theory. One
is doing epistemics on the tree rather than thematrix. The other is incorporating
weak, not just strong, dominance. We start with the tree.
Example 5.1 (A Second Coordination Game) Consider the coordination game
in Fig. 3 and the associated type structure in Fig. 4 (where there happens to be
one type for each player).
Pick the state (Out, ta, Out, tb). Ann plays Out, believing Bob plays Out.
Both players get a payoff of 1.
It can be checked that the rational strategy-type pairs are Ra1 = {(Out, ta)}
and Rb1 = {(Out, tb), (In, tb)}. Since both types assign probability 1 to rational
strategy-type pairs for the other player, we get Ra2 = Ra1 and Rb2 = Rb1, and so
Ram = Ra1 and Rbm = Rb1 by induction. In particular then, there is RCBR at the
state (Out , ta, Out, tb).
This isn’t the BI path (onwhich both players choose In). But as noted earlier,
an epistemic model is just a description of a game situation. In the case of a
perfect-information (PI) tree, the situation may or may not involve play of the
BI path. (Of course, we will be very interested later in looking for conditions
under which the BI path is played.)
This said, there is nevertheless a conceptual problem with the scenario. Ann
plays Out because she believes Bob plays Out. She believes this because she
believes Bob believes she plays Out, and so is indifferent between his choices.
(His expected payoff is 1, regardless of his choice.) But Ann knows that if
instead she played In, Bob would see this, so she needs to think about how Bob
would react. The epistemic model of Sect. 4 doesn’t allow us to specify this. In
the example, we can calculate Bob’s (ex ante) expected payoffs, as above. But
we can’t calculate his conditional expected payoffs (from In vs.Out), given the




























In 0, 0 2, 2
B
A
Out 1, 1 1, 1
Now, the second problem we have to solve: incorporating weak as well as
strong dominance on the matrix. The results we mentioned in Sect. 4 say that
our epistemic set-up yields the IU strategies. Of course, an undominated – even
IU – strategy may be inadmissible.
Example 5.2 Figure 5 is the strategic form of the tree in Fig. 3. If we use the
same type structure as in Fig. 4, then there is again RCBR at the state (Out, ta,
Out, tb).
But if we want rationality to mean avoiding inadmissible strategies, then
Bob should play In notOut – even thoughOut isn’t strongly dominated. Should
Ann then assign probability 0 to Bob’s playing Out? This leads to the concep-
tual problem on which we quoted Mas-Colell et al. (1995, p. 240): Wouldn’t
this conflict with the idea of admissibility, which says that a player considers as
possible (even if unlikely) any of the strategies for the other players.
Yet, admissibility seems a very reasonable, even basic, requirement. See
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, Sect. 2.7) for a thorough discussion and defense.
Kolhberg and Mertens also point out the connection between admissibility and
invariance (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986, Sect. 2.4) – which we will consider in
Sect. 12.
In the next section, we will look at how to modify probability theory to solve
both this problem in the matrix and the problem in the tree.
6 Extended probabilities I
Both problems we identified involve the treatment of probability-0 events. Two
extensions of ordinary probability theory have been used in the epistemic pro-
gram, to tackle these problems.
On the tree, an appropriate tool is conditional probability systems (CPS’s),
due to Rényi (1955). A CPS specifies a family of conditioning events E and a
measure pE for each such event, together with certain restrictions on thesemea-
sures. The interpretation is that pE is what the player believes, after observing
E. The key is that even if p(E) = 0 (where  is the entire space), the measure
pE is still specified. That is, even ifE is ‘unexpected,’ the player has a measure if
E nevertheless happens. Myerson (1991, Chap. 1) provided a preference-based
axiomatization of a class of CPS’s. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999; 2002) further
developed both the pure theory and the game-theoretic application of CPS’s,
as we will discuss in detail later.
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On the matrix, an appropriate tool is lexicographic probability systems
(LPS’s), introduced and axiomatized by Blume et al. (1991a;b). An LPS spec-
ifies a sequence of probability measures. The interpretation is that the states
that get positive probability under the first measure make up the player’s pri-
mary hypothesis about the true state. But the player recognizes that his primary
hypothesis might be mistaken, and so also forms a secondary hypothesis, con-
sisting of the states that get positive probability under the second measure.
Then his tertiary hypothesis, and so on. The primary states can be thought of as
infinitely more likely than the secondary states, which are infinitely more likely
than the tertiary states, etc. Stahl (1995), Stalnaker (1998), Asheim (2001), and
Brandenburger et al. (2006), among other papers, use LPS’s.
Example 6.1 Let’s go back to the gameof Fig. 3, to see howCPS’swork. Figure 6
is another type structure for this game, different from the one in Fig. 4. The
difference is that here the probabilities come from CPS’s, as we will explain.
Start with Ann and the first node in the tree. Formally, this is the event {Out,
In} × {tb} – i.e., the event that Bob chooses either of his strategies. Ann assigns
probability 1 to Out, given this event (essentially as before). Next, Bob. At the
root of the tree, he assigns probability 1 to Ann’s playing Out (as before). But
now we also have to specify what Bob believes at the second node in the tree.
Formally, this is the event {(In, ta)} – i.e., the event that Ann chooses In. One of
the conditions of a CPS is that pE(E) = 1. (Conceptually, this says that players
believe what they observe.) So at the second node, Bob must assign probability
1 to {(In, ta)}. This is the measure shown in square brackets.
Example 6.2 Figure 7 is a type structure for the game of Fig. 5, that now specifies
LPS’s.
Each player has a primary hypothesis that assigns probability 1 to the other
player’s choosing Out. But each player also has a secondary hypothesis that
assigns probability 1 to the other player’s choosing In. These measures are
shown in parentheses.
We see how LPS’s can solve the conceptual problem with admissibility: All




























positive probability under some measure. But states can also be ruled out, in
the sense that they can be give infinitely less weight than other states. (We will
see later though, in Sect. 9, that there is a further challenge to overcome before
LPS’s yield an analysis of IA.)
For the general definitions ofCPS’s andLPS’s, andCPS-based andLPS-based
type structures (extending Definition 4.1), see the papers referenced above.6
7 Extended probabilities II
Let us now check that extended probabilities really do work the way we want.
We saw in the type structure of Fig. 4, which used ordinary probabilities, that
RCBR holds at the state (Out, ta, Out, tb). What epistemic conditions hold at
the state (Out, ta, Out, tb) in Fig. 6?
To say which strategy-type pairs are rational, we need a definition of ratio-
nality with CPS’s. Here is the natural definition: Fix a strategy-type pair (si, ti),
where ti is associated with a CPS. Call this pair rational (in the tree) if the
following holds: Fix any information set H for i allowed by si, and look at the
measure given H (i.e., given the event that the other players’ strategies allow
H). Require that si maximizes i’s expected payoff under this measure, among
all strategies ri for i that allow H .
So (Out, ta) is rational for Ann. At her node, Ann assigns probability 1 to
Bob’s playing Out, making Out optimal for her. But (Out, tb) is irrational for
Bob. At his node, he assigns probability 1 to Ann’s playing In (as he must),
and so he gets an expected payoff of 2 from In, as opposed to 0 from Out. The
irrationality of (Out, tb) is what we want intuitively.
Next, what does Ann think about Bob’s rationality? To answer, we need a
CPS-analog to belief (as defined in Sect. 4). Ben Porath (1997) proposed the
following:7 Say player i initially believes event E if E gets probability 1 given
the root of the tree, under i’s CPS. (Formally, the conditioning event includes
all strategy profiles of the other players.) This implies that E gets probability
1 at any information set H that gets positive probability under the measure
given the root. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) strengthened this definition
to: Say player i strongly believes event E if for every information set H with
E ∩ (H × T−i) = ∅, the measure given H assigns probability 1 to E. That is,
player i believes E, whenever E is possible given what i observes.
It is immediate in Fig. 6 that Ann’s type ta doesn’t initially believe (so cer-
tainly doesn’t strongly believe) that Bob is rational. This is different from the
situation in Example 5.1, whereAnn believes Bob is rational – and there is even
RCBR. Again, the new answer is the intuitively correct one.
Now, the analysis of Example 6.2.What epistemic conditions hold at the state
(Out, ta, Out, tb) in Fig. 7?
6 In particular, definitions on infinite spaces turn out to be crucial; see Sect. 9 below.
7 We have taken the liberty of changing terminology, for consistency with “strong belief” below.
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To answer, we need LPS-analogs to rationality and belief. For rationality,
fix strategy-type pairs (si, ti) and (ri, ti) for player i, where ti is now associated
with an LPS. Calculate the tuple of expected payoffs to i from si, using first the
primarymeasure associated with ti, then the secondarymeasure associated with
ti, etc. Calculate the corresponding tuple for ri. If the first tuple lexicographi-
cally exceeds the second, then si is preferred to ri.8 A strategy-type pair (si, ti)
is rational (in the lexicographic sense) if si is maximal under this ranking.
So, as before, (Out, ta) is rational for Ann. For Bob, both Out and In give an
expected payoff of 1 under his primary measure. But In gives him an expected
payoff of 2 under his secondary measure, as opposed to an expected payoff of 0
from Out. We want (Out, tb) to be irrational for Bob, since Out is inadmissible.
What does each player think about the other’s rationality? For this, we need
an LPS-analog to belief. An early candidate in the literature was: Say player i
believes event E at the 1st level if E gets primary probability 1 under i’s LPS
(Börgers 1994; Brandenburger 1992).
A stronger concept (but still weaker than belief) is: Say i assumes E if all
states not in E are infinitely less likely than all states in E, under i’s LPS. (See
Brandenburger et al. (2006) for the general definition, which covers infinite
spaces.) In other words, a player who assumes E recognizes E may not happen,
but is prepared to ‘count on’ E versus not-E.
Clearly, in Fig. 7, Ann’s type ta doesn’t 1st-level believe (so certainly doesn’t
assume) that Bob is rational. (In fact, type ta assumes Bob is irrational.) Again,
this is what we want intuitively.
8 Resolving the paradoxes I
Let us use our language for the tree – involving type structures and CPS’s – to
go back to the paradox of BI. The problem was whether it is possible to find
epistemic conditions that yield BI in a formal and unambiguous manner.
For the simple coordination tree of Example 5.1, the obvious condition of
RCBR does not necessarily yield BI, as we saw. But this was because of a defi-
ciency of the language. Does the language with CPS’s work better? The answer
is yes. Regardless of the type structure, Bob must play In if he is rational,
because the definition of a CPS requires him, at his information set, to assign
probability 1 to Ann’s playing In. If Ann initially (or strongly) believes Bob is
rational, and is rational, she too will play In. The BI path results.
This is very straightforward. But will we get a similar answer in more com-
plicated trees? First some definitions. Paralleling Definition 4.2, with CPS’s
we can define inductively rationality and mth-order initial belief of rationality
(RmIBR) at a state of a type structure, and rationality and common initial belief
of rationality (RCIBR). (See Ben Porath 1997.) Similarly, we can define ratio-
nality and mth-order strong belief of rationality (RmSBR), and rationality and
8 If x = (x1, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, . . . , yn), then x lexicographically exceeds y if yj > xj implies


















common strong belief of rationality (RCSBR). (See Battigalli and Siniscalchi
2002.) The question is then: Does the condition of RCIBR, or perhaps RCSBR,
yield BI in a perfect-information (PI) tree?
Example 8.1 (Three-Legged Centipede) Figure 8 is three-legged Centipede
(where the top payoffs are Ann’s, and the bottom payoffs are Bob’s), and
Fig. 9 is an associated CPS-based type structure.
Type ta forAnnhas themeasure shown in the top-leftmatrix. This is hermea-
sure at the first node in the tree. Since this measure assigns positive probability
(in fact, probability 1) to her second node (i.e., to the event that Bob chooses
In), it determines her measure there. By contrast, type ua for Ann assigns prob-
ability 0 to her second node. The measure there is shown in square brackets
(and assigns probability 1 to {(In, tb)}). Both of Bob’s types initially assign prob-
ability 1 to Ann’s playing Out. At his node, Bob’s type tb assigns probability 1
to {(Across, ta)}, while his type ub assigns probability 1 to {(Down, ta)}.
Let us list the rational strategy-type pairs in this example. They are (Down,
ta), (Out, ua), (In, tb) , and (Out, ub). We see that both of Ann’s types ta and
ua initially (even strongly) believe Bob is rational. Also, both of Bob’s types
initially believe that Ann is rational. (But note that tb doesn’t strongly believe
thatAnn is rational.We come back to this.) Given this, a simple induction shows
that at the state (Down, ta, In, tb) for instance, RCIBR holds.
This kind of example is the focus of Ben Porath (1997), a key step forward
in the epistemic program. Let’s interpret it. Ann plays across at her first node,
believing (initially) that Bob will play In, so she can get a payoff of 4. Why
would Bob play In? Because he initially believes that Ann plays Out. But in
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probability 1 to Ann’s playing across at her second node – i.e., to Ann’s being
irrational. He therefore (rationally) plays In. In more everyday language, by
playing across at her first node, Ann ‘bluffs’ Bob into believing she is irrational
and will play across at her second node.9
Interestingly, this is exactly the line of reasoning fromMas-Colell et al. (1995,
p. 282) we quoted earlier. So, in fact, there is no contradiction or impossibility
with this reasoning – we have just given a formal set-up in which it holds. The
resolution of the BI paradox is, rather, to accept that even under the condition
of RCIBR – which a priori might be expected to yield BI – the BI path may not
result.
But one can also argue that RCIBR is not the right condition: it is too weak.
In the above example, Bob realizes that he might be ‘surprised’ in the play of
the game – that is why he has a CPS, not just an ordinary probability measure.
If he realizes he might be surprised, should he abandon his (initial) belief that
Ann is rational when he is surprised? Bob’s type tb does so. This brings us back
to strong belief (Battigalli and Siniscalchi 2002). The argument says that we
want tb to strongly believe, not just initially believe, that Ann is rational. Type
tb will strongly believe Ann is rational if we move the probability-1 weight (in
square brackets) on (Across, ta) to (Down, ta). But now (In, tb) isn’t rational for
Bob, so Ann doesn’t (even initially) believe Bob is rational. It looks as if the
example unravels.
So, replacing initial belief with strong belief, the question is: Does RCSBR
yield the BI path in Centipede? The answer is yes: Fix a CPS-based type struc-
ture for n-legged Centipede (Fig. 10), and a state at which there is RCSBR. Then
Ann plays Out.
The result follows from Friedenberg (2002). Here is a verbal argument. Sup-
pose to the contrary that there is an RCSBR state at which Ann plays across
at the first node. Consider the length of play at each such state (before Ann or
Bob plays Out), and pick a state (sa, ta, sb, tb) with the longest play. Suppose it
is Bob who ends the game, by playing Out at node H. (If it is Ann, a similar
argument works.) Then the event “Bob is rational, Bob is rational and strongly
believes Ann is rational, ...” (denote this E) and the event “Ann’s node H − 1
is reached” (denote this F) have a nonempty intersection. But Ann’s type ta
strongly believes E. (This uses the assumption that ta strongly believes each
of the events “Bob is rational,” “Bob is rational and strongly believes Ann
9 At the state (Down, ta, In, tb), the bluff works. But at the state (Down, ta,Out, ub), Ann attempts
the bluff and it fails.
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is rational,” ..., and a conjunction property of strong belief.) It follows that at
H−1, type ta assigns probability 1 toE. AtH−1, type ta also assigns probability
1 to F (by one of the defining properties of a CPS). Therefore at H − 1, type
ta assigns probability 1 to E ∩ F. By construction, at H − 1, type ta must then
assign probability 1 to the event that Bob plays Out exactly at H. But then if
ra is the strategy for Ann that plays across until H − 1 and Out at H − 1, this
strategy yields Ann a higher expected payoff at H − 1 under ta, than does sa
(which plays across at H − 1). This contradicts the rationality of (sa, ta).10
This result gives a second resolution of the BI paradox – at least as far as Cen-
tipede is concerned. As above, no contradiction or impossibility in reasoning
about the game is found. Moreover, we have found a very natural line of
reasoning that actually yields BI, unlike earlier.
Let us reemphasize that an epistemic analysis is not a prediction independent
of the specific assumptions made. In Centipede, if RCSBR holds, the BI path
results. But RCSBR need not hold. In fact, it seems a stringent assumption11
and quite plausibly might not hold. For example, we might want to assume only
that both players are rational and strongly believe the other is rational – much
less than RCSBR.12 Without RCSBR, the BI path won’t necessarily obtain.
(We already saw this in Example 8.1 above.)
Later, we will look at whether what we have found for Centipede generalizes
to other PI games. First, we want to go back to the matrix and LPS’s.
So, again followingDefinition 4.2, with LPS’s we can define inductively ratio-
nality and mth-order 1st-level belief of rationality (Rm1BR) at a state of a type
structure, and rationality and common 1st-level belief of rationality (RC1BR).
Likewise, we can define rationality and mth-order assumption of rationality
(RmAR), and rationality and common assumption of rationality (RCAR).
What do these conditions yield?
Fig. 11
L R
M 0, 0 0, 1
D 1, 1 1, 1
B
A
U 0, 1 2, 0
10 Aumann (1998) provides knowledge-based epistemic conditions under which Ann plays Out in
Centipede (proved via a forward-looking argument). Knowledge-based models are different from
the belief-based models we are looking at here; see Sect. 13 below.
11 Aumann (1995) calls an assumption such as this one “an ideal condition that is rarely met in
practice…. This is not a value judgment; ‘ideal’ is meant as in ‘ideal gas’.”
12 Note that we are talking only about the plausibility of departures from an epistemic ‘baseline.’
Sorin (1998) gives a method for quantifying the size of such departures.







































Example 8.2 Figure 12 is an LPS-based type structure for the game of Fig. 11.
(The secondary measures are in single parentheses, the third-level measures in
double parentheses, the fourth-level measures in triple parentheses.)
The rational strategy-type pairs are (U, ta), (D,ua), (R, tb), and (L,ub). Also,
each type assigns primary probability 1 to rational strategy-type pairs for the
other player, so each type believes at the 1st level that the other player is
rational. By induction, RC1BR holds at the state (U, ta,R, tb), for example.
But notice that while type tb for Bob believes at the 1st level that Ann is
rational, this type doesn’t assume Ann is rational. This is because tb consid-
ers the irrational strategy-type pair (M, ta) for Ann infinitely more likely than
the rational pair (U, ta). Arguably, if Bob is really ‘trying to think’ that Ann
is rational, he should put the rational pair (U, ta) first. If he does, then he will
rationally play L not R. Ann, presumably, will play D. The (unique) IA profile
(D,L) results.
If we replace belief at the 1st level with assumption – i.e., consider RCAR
in place of RC1BR – in the game of Fig. 11, then the IA outcome (1, 1) will
always result. Here is a proof for the finite case. Fix an arbitrary finite LPS-
based type structure, and a state at which there is RCAR. Let Ann’s type at
this state be ta. Certainly, Ann cannot play M at this state, since this is (even
strongly) dominated. Can Ann play U? If so, since she is rational, the primary
measure associated with ta must put positive weight on R. That is, there must
be a type vb for Bob such that (R, vb) gets positive primary probability. Since
Ann’s type ta assumes Bob is rational, (R, vb) must be rational. Ann’s strat-
egy-type pair (U, ta) gets positive probability under some measure in the LPS
associated with vb. So, for (R, vb) to be rational, there must be a type va for
Ann such that (M, va) gets positive probability under this same measure, or an
earlier measure, in the LPS associated with vb. But then, vb does not assume
Ann is rational, since it doesn’t make the rational strategy-type pair (U, ta) infi-
nitely more likely than the irrational pair (M, va) (recall that M is dominated).
This says rationality and 2nd-order assumption of rationality fails – so certainly
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(The claim is also true for a general type structure. This follows from Theorem
6.1(i) in Brandenburger et al. 2006.)
Does the same conclusion hold in all games? We will see in the next section.
9 Resolving the paradoxes II
Back to the tree, and the condition of RCSBR. It turns out that the result that
RCSBR yields BI in Centipede was, indeed, special. In general, RCSBR need
not yield the BI outcome in a PI game. (We will say later what makes Centipede
special.)
Example 9.1 (A Third Coordination Game) Consider the coordination game
in Fig. 13 and the associated CPS-based type structure in Fig. 14.
The rational strategy-type pairs are (Out, ta) and (Out, tb) for Ann and
Bob respectively. Ann’s type ta strongly believes {(Out, tb)}, and Bob’s type tb
strongly believes {(Out, ta)}. By induction, RCSBR holds at the state (Out, ta,
Out, tb).
Here is a game of pure coordination (so that the BI outcome is even Pareto
dominant), but the BI outcome need not arise under RCSBR. The key is to see
that both (Down, ta) and (Across, ta) are irrational for Ann, since she (strongly)
believes Bob playsOut . So, at his node, Bob can’t believe Ann is rational. If he
considers it sufficiently more likely Ann will play Down rather than Across, he
will rationally play Out (as happens). In short, if Ann doesn’t play Out, she is
irrational and so ‘all bets are off’ as to what she will do. She could play Down.
The situation described in Example 9.1 may be surprising, at least at first
blush, but there does not appear to be anything conceptually wrong with it.
Indeed, it points to an interesting way in which the players in a game can
literally be trapped by their beliefs – which here prevent them from getting
their mutually preferred (3, 3) outcome.13
13 The (3, 3) outcome does seem very salient in Fig. 13. But the game itself is only a partial descrip-
tion of the strategic situation. A full description includes a type structure – our claim is that if the
type structure is as in Fig. 14, the saliency of (3, 3) disappears.






















This said, we still want to identify epistemic conditions which yield the BI
outcome in any PI game. We will look at several routes.
Here is the first. Consider the following line of reasoning in Example 9.1 (it
gets formalized below): If Ann forgoes the payoff of 2 she can get by playing
Out at the first node, then surely she must be playing Across to get 3. Playing
Down to get 0 makes little sense since this is lower than the payoff she gave
up at the first node. But if Bob considers Across (sufficiently) more likely than
Down, he will play In. Presumably then, Ann will indeed play Across, and the
BI path results.
There is no contradiction with the previous analysis because in Fig. 14, Ann is
irrational once she doesn’t playOut, so we can’t say Ann should then rationally
play Across not Down. To make Across rational for Ann, we have to add more
types to the structure. This key insight is due to Stalnaker (1998) and Battigalli
and Siniscalchi (2002). To see how it works, add a second type ua for Ann that
is the ‘reverse’ of type ta, as in Fig. 15. The rational strategy-type pairs for Ann
are now (Out, ta) and (Across, ua), as shaded. If Bob strongly believes Ann is
rational, then at his node he must assign probability 1 to Ann’s playing Across.
He will rationally play In. This means type ta for Ann doesn’t (strongly) believe
Bob is rational. The non-BI scenario unravels.
The solution concept that this line of argument yields is extensive-form
rationalizability (EFR), due to Pearce (1984). Battigalli (1997) showed that
EFR yields the BI outcome in a PI game (under an assumption ruling out cer-
tain payoff ties). So, we will get epistemic conditions for BI, as desired. But
note that the reasoning above is also forward-induction (FI) reasoning à la
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, Sect. 2.3). EFR captures FI, too. (Interestingly,
while Kohlberg and Mertens introduced FI in the context of non-PI games, we
now see that it already arises in PI games – such as Fig. 13.)
To finish the epistemic analysis: Battigalli and Siniscalchi consider a complete
CPS-based type structure, which contains, in a certain sense, every possible
type for each player. Go back to Definition 4.1. A type structure as defined




U 0, 0 1, 3
D 3, 1 0, 0
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A
















(Borel) measure on S−i ×T−i, there is a type of player i with that measure.14 A
complete CPS-based type structure is defined analogously. Battigalli and Sini-
scalchi prove: Fix a complete CPS-based type structure. If there is RCSBR at the
state (s1, t1, . . . , sn, tn), then the strategy profile (s1, . . . , sn) is extensive-form ratio-
nalizable. Conversely, if the profile (s1, . . . , sn) is extensive-form rationalizable,
then there is a state (s1, t1, . . . , sn, tn) at which there is RCSBR.
Next, back to the matrix again. The answer to the question at the end of the
previous section is that, in fact, RCAR need not yield an IA outcome.
Example 9.2 (Battle of the Sexes With an Outside Option) Figure 16 is the
strategic form of Battle of the Sexes With an Outside Option (Kohlberg and
Mertens (1986, Sect. 2.3); Osborne andRubinstein (1994, Ex.110.1)) and Fig. 17
is an associated LPS-based type structure.
The rational strategy-type pairs are (Out, ta) and (R, tb). (Both L and R give
Bob a primary expected payoff of 2, but R gives Bob a secondary expected
payoff of 3, versus 0 from L.) By induction, RCAR holds at (Out, ta, R, tb).
Yet the IA outcome is (3, 1). (Osborne andRubinstein observe that IA in this
game gives the Kohlberg and Mertens FI outcome.) As in Example 9.1, there
is no conceptual problem with this non-IA scenario. Still, how can we get IA?
What is needed is for Bob to consider D infinitely more likely than U, rather
than vice versa. Then he will rationally play L, not R, and Ann presumably will
playD. One reason to giveU infinitely less weight thanD is that it is eliminated
on the first round of IA. Of course, we don’t want just to assume the answer
and require the weights to work this way. The key again is completeness. Notice
that while choosing U can never be rational for Ann (for any type), choosing
D can be rational. In Fig. 18, we have added a second type for Ann, which
indeed makes D rational for her, and shaded her rational strategy-type pairs.
14 Completeness is defined in Brandenburger (2003). A complete type structure will be uncount-
ably infinite.






















If Bob assumes Ann is rational, he must consider the shaded states infinitely
more likely than the unshaded ones – so he will play L, as desired.
For the general case, we need a definition of a complete LPS-based type
structure. See Brandenburger et al. (2006) for a formal treatment that shows
the following: Fix a complete LPS-based type structure. If there is RmAR at
the state (s1, t1, . . . , sn, tn), then the strategy profile (s1, . . . , sn) survives (m + 1)
rounds of iterated admissibility. Conversely, if the profile (s1, . . . , sn) survives
(m + 1) rounds of iterated admissibility, then there is a state (s1, t1, . . . , sn, tn) at
which there is RmAR.
Some observations: First, the result is stated for RmAR and not RCAR. See
Sects. 10 – 11 below for the reason. Of course, for a given game, there is an m
such that IA stabilizes after m rounds.
Remember that the ‘philosophy’ underneath admissibility is that a player
should not rule out any strategies for the other players. The result says that
underneath IA is the idea that a player should consider not only all strategies,
but also all types, for the other players.
Next, IA yields the BI outcome in a PI game (ruling out certain payoff ties).
See Marx and Swinkels (1997). So understanding IA gives a second epistemic
analysis of BI, in addition to the EFR-based analysis above. (We say more in
Sect. 12 below about strategic- vs. extensive-form analysis.)
Here is a third route to getting BI in PI games, different from the complete-
ness route. Asheim (2001) develops an epistemic analysis using the properness
concept (Myerson 1978). Go back to Example 9.1. The properness idea says
that Bob’s type tb should view (Across, ta) as infinitely more likely than (Down,
ta) since Across is the less costly ‘mistake’ for Ann, given her type ta. Unlike
the completeness route taken above, the irrationality of bothDown andAcross
(given Ann’s type ta) is accepted. But the relative ranking of these ‘mistakes’
must be in the right order.With this ranking, Bob is irrational to playOut rather
than In. Ann presumably will play Across, and we get BI again. Asheim (2001)
formulates a general such result.
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Finally, we point out once more that BI – and IA – aren’t inevitable predic-
tions of an epistemic analysis. These predictions rest on very specific conditions
on the game, such as RCSBR, RmAR, and completeness.
10 Solution concepts
In analyzing our game-theoretic paradoxes, we have considered a number of
epistemic conditions. Here, we organize these conditions and see that a uni-
fied picture emerges. Basically, the conditions are all characterized by various
forms of iterated dominance. Someof these dominance concepts have only been
understood – or even defined – via the epistemic program. So these discoveries
and the overall scheme that emerges are another benefit of the program.
The first epistemic condition was RCBR (rationality and common belief of
rationality). Then we looked at various ‘refinements’ of RCBR, as summarized
in Table 1. Table 2 shows what is known about the characterization of these
conditions. (Here ≈ means “is characterized by”.)
Some comments on the table:
a. In the first row, IU is the set of iteratively undominated strategies (Sect. 4).
b. In the second row, S∞W is the set of strategies that remain after one
round of deletion of inadmissible (weakly dominated) strategies followed
by iterated deletion of strongly dominated strategies (Dekel and Fudenberg
1990). Also in the second row, S∞CD is the set of strategies that remain
after one round of deletion of conditionally dominated strategies (Shimoji
andWatson 1998) followed by iterated deletion of strongly dominated strat-
egies. As a special case here, Ben Porath (1997) showed that in PI games
satisfying a no-ties condition, RCIBR is characterized by S∞W. Example
8.1 is an instance of this. The S∞W set in three-legged Centipede is {Out,
Down} × {In, Out}, so certainly includes the profile (Down, In) we saw was
possible under RCIBR.
c. In the third row, m-IA (resp.m-EFR) is the set of strategies that remain
after m rounds of iterated admissibility (resp.m rounds of extensive-form
rationalizability). We also record that EFR is equivalent round-for-round
to iterated conditional dominance (ICD) – which is essentially “iterated
strong dominance on the tree.” (See Shimoji and Watson 1998.) Similar
Table 1
Matrix Tree
RCBR (Rationality and common belief of rationality)
RC1BR (Rationality and common RCIBR (Rationality and common
1st-level belief of rationality) initial belief of rationality)
RCAR (Rationality and common RCSBR (Rationality and common
assumption of rationality) strong belief of rationality)
LPS-Completeness CPS-Completeness




RC1BR ≈ S∞W (See Brandenburger
1992, Börgers 1994)
RCIBR ≈ S∞CD (See Ben Porath 1997,
Battigalli and Siniscalchi 1999)
RmAR & Completeness ≈ (m + 1)-IA
(See Brandenburger et al. 2006)
RmSBR&Completeness ≈ (m+1)-EFR
(= (m+1)-ICD) (See Battigalli and Sinis-
calchi 2002)
PI Games: m-IA yields BI outcome
(for sufficiently large m) (See Marx and
Swinkels 1997)
PIGames:m-EFR yields BI outcome (for
sufficiently large m) (See Battigalli 1997)
RCAR & Completeness is impossible
(See Brandenburger et al. 2006)
RCSBR & Completeness ≈ EFR
(= ICD) (See Battigalli and Siniscalchi
2002)
PI Games: EFR yields BI outcome
RCAR ≈ SAS (See Brandenburger et al.
2006)
RCSBR ≈ ?
PI Games: RCAR yields a Nash-equilib-
rium outcome (See Brandenburger and
Friedenberg 2004)
PI Games: RCSBR yields a Nash-equilib-
rium outcome (See Friedenberg 2002)
to the second row, we get equality between the left-hand and right-hand
solution concepts in the third row for the case of a generic tree. (See, e.g.,
Shimoji 2004.)
d. Note the impossibility result in the fourth row. RCAR is impossible in a
complete (LPS-based) type structure. We come back to this in the next
section.
e. In the fifth row, SAS stands for “self-admissible set,” defined in Branden-
burger et al. (2006). SAS’s may be viewed as the weak-dominance analog
to Pearce (1984) best-response sets (BRS’s). But while the BRS’s of a game
are all contained in the IU set, the SAS’s need not be contained in the IA
set. We saw this in Battle of the Sexes With an Outside Option (Example
9.2). The profile (Out, R) was playable under RCAR, but even disjoint
from the IA set. (In Example 8.2, we argued that an SAS outcome was an
IA outcome – but this was special.)
f. Also in the fifth row, note that the characterization of RCSBR in general
trees is open.
g. The table notes what various solution concepts yield in the special case of
PI games. These statements are proved under various payoff restrictions.
See the references for details.
h. Note, in particular, the result that in a PI game, RCSBR yields a Nash-equi-
libriumoutcome. This is the ‘real’ reasonwhyRCSBRgivesBI inCentipede
(Sect. 8). In Centipede, there is a unique Nash path and it coincides with
the BI path. Of course, this isn’t true in general – e.g., the Coordination
Game in Example 9.1.
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Much of the epistemic program in game theory can be thought of as studying
‘refinements’ of the basic RCBR condition on a game. (Table 2 shows what
is known about some of these refinements – but it is certainly not exhaus-
tive.) To some extent, the program can be seen as a response to the equilib-
rium refinements program of the 1980s. In that program, the starting point was
Nash equilibrium. Various modifications of equilibrium were proposed, and
attempts made to interpret these as reflecting one or another underlying notion
of rationality (plus belief in rationality, etc.). For Mertens, a leading propo-
nent, this direction of analysis was a conscious choice: “In this way, we may
eventually reach an axiomatisation, and an interpretation in terms of rational-
ity, without imposing any explicit preconception about what rationality exactly
means, except for some general a priori requirement[s]” (Mertens 1989, p. 583).
The epistemic program is different in two ways. It starts with explicit defini-
tions of rationality, belief, etc., refines these conditions, and tries to work out
implications for the play of a game. Also, Nash equilibrium is no longer the
starting point, but a particular case (as noted in Sect. 4).
11 Paradox regained?
Naturally, the epistemic program has uncovered new foundational questions
in game theory. The existence of structures containing all possible types of the
players (Sect. 9) is one such issue. After all, such a structure sounds rather like
the “sets of everything” that are well known to cause difficulties in mathematics
(Russell’s Paradox, etc.). Can such a structure actually exist?15
In the literature, various kinds of ‘large’ type structures havebeen considered.
When types are associated with ordinary probabilities, existence results were
obtained byArmbruster and Böge (1979), Böge andEisele (1979),Mertens and
Zamir (1985), and others. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999) and Brandenburger
et al. (2006) give existence results for the cases of CPS’s and LPS’s respectively.
But non-existence is also possible; see, e.g., Fagin et al. (1999), Heifetz and
Samet (1999), Meier (2005), and Brandenburger and Keisler (2006).16
A way to understand the boundary between the existence and non-existence
results is via mathematical logic. The epistemic approach to game theory says
that players havebeliefs about the game–about other players’ strategies, beliefs,
rationality, etc. Now, we add a specific language – i.e., logic – in which these
15 Are complete type structures really needed for the theorems quoted in Sect. 9? (I am grateful
to the referees for raising this issue.) Examples 9.1 and 9.2 show that an arbitrary type structure
won’t suffice, but also suggest that perhaps we can add just the ‘right’ types to the given structure,
without adding all possible types. The difficulty with this approach is that what the right types are
will depend on the game in question. (If tailoring epistemic conditions to a particular game, we
could even require directly that the strategy profile we’re interested in is played.) Completeness
seems an appropriate game-independent condition.
16 There are also existence results (e.g., Aumann 1999) and non-existence results (e.g., Fagin 1994;
Heifetz and Samet (1998); Heifetz (1999), for knowledge structures (Sect. 13 below).
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beliefs are formed. See the papers in Special Issue on Interactive Epistemology
(this journal 1999) and the references there.
Analyzed thisway, the boundary between existence andnon-existence results
turns on the expressibility of the language considered. In particular, the papers
cited above (and others) that give existence results make various topological
and measure-theoretic assumptions that, from a logical perspective, effectively
restrict the language the players can use to form beliefs. With the restrictions,
spaces of all beliefs become possible.
A largely open area is to find logics that allow us to carry out epistemic
analyses like the ones discussed in the earlier sections. Such logics must be able
to express concepts such as rationality, strong belief, assumption, etc., allow
the existence of complete structures, and yield conclusions about solution con-
cepts, as earlier. An analysis of this type would have the benefit of being much
more explicit about the players’ reasoning processes in games. Ewerhart (2002)
and Board (2002; 2004) take steps in this direction – on the matrix and tree,
respectively.
Let’s go back to the pre-logical – i.e., topological and measure-theoretic
– approach to getting complete type structures. Table 2 indicates that, even
then, there is a ‘limit to analysis.’ For a given game matrix and any number
m, RmAR is possible under completeness, but RCAR under completeness is
impossible. True, neither condition is in any way necessary for a satisfactory
analysis of a game. (In Sect. 9, we emphasized in particular that incomplete
structures are meaningful and interesting.) But both conditions do seem basic
to a ‘fully rational’ analysis of games, and the fact that both can’t hold is definitely
disturbing.
The analogous conditions on the tree – RCSBR and (CPS-based vs. LPS-
based) completeness – are consistent. (Refer again to Table 2 and to Sect. 9.)
Why the difference? The basic reason appears to be that the strategic-form
analysis is more demanding. In particular, it satisfies an invariance requirement,
discussed next.
12 Strategic versus Extensive analysis 17
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, Sect. 2.4) argued that a ‘fully rational’ analysis
of games should be invariant – i.e., should depend only on the fully reduced
strategic form.18 (See also Mertens (1989, p. 582) for further discussion.) In this
they appealed to early results in game theory (Dalkey 1953; Thompson 1952)
which established that two trees sharing the same reduced strategic form differ
from each other by a (finite) sequence of elementary transformations of the
tree, each of which can be argued to be ‘strategically inessential.’ Kohlberg and
17 This section draws on material in “CommonAssumption of Rationality in Games” by Branden-
burger and Friedenberg (2002) This paper is superseded by Brandenburger et al. (2006).
18 The strategic form after elimination of any (pure) strategies that are duplicates or convex
combinations of other strategies.
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Mertens added a fourth transformation involving convex combinations, to get
to the fully reduced strategic form.19
As for how to ensure invariance, Kohlberg andMertens (1986, Sect. 2.7) give
the essential idea, although couched in terms of equilibrium. Here, we give a
purely decision-theoretic version (which is then directly relevant to epistemic
analysis). Fix a decision tree T – i.e., a two-player game tree, where one player
(D) is the decision maker and the other player (N) is Nature, and we specify
payoffs for D only. Let  be the matrix associated with T, where D chooses
the row and N chooses the column. Say that T reduces to matrix M if  differs
from M by the addition of duplicate rows or columns, or rows that are convex
combinations of other rows.20 We then have: A row in M is admissible if and
only if it is rational in every tree T that reduces to M.
The forward direction uses standard arguments.21 For the converse, let r be a
row in M that is weakly dominated by a mixture of rows σ , and let C be the set
of columns on which σ does strictly better than r. Consider the following tree
T: (i) D moves first and chooses between the single move {r, σ } and any of the
other rows; (ii)N then moves, in ignorance of this move, and chooses a column;
(iii) finally, if D chose {r, σ } and N chose one of the columns from C, there is a
single information setH at whichD gets to choose between r and σ . The tree T
reduces to M. Also, choosing σ at H will be strictly better for D than choosing
r, so r isn’t rational in T, as required.
So, in decision theory, admissibility implies invariance – in fact, is equiva-
lent to it. If we build up our game analysis using a decision theory that satisfies
admissibility, we can hope to get invariance at this level too. LPS-based decision
theory satisfies admissibility. As wanted, the resulting strategic-form solution
concepts in Table 2 – S∞W, m-IA, SAS – are all invariant in the Kohlberg and
Mertens sense. (SeeBrandenburger andFriedenberg 2004.) The extensive-form
concepts in Table 2 aren’t.
Back to the epistemic conditions: RmAR and completeness yields an invari-
ant prediction, because (m+1)-IA is invariant.Arguably then, the inconsistency
of RCAR and completeness – as opposed to the consistency of RCSBR and
completeness – is the price that has to be paid for having an invariant analysis.
In any event, it does seem that some basic requirement has to be given up in
the search for the ‘fully rational’ analysis of games. If not exactly a paradox,
this is certainly a surprising situation for game theory. To quote Mertens (1989,
p. 583):
19 The Dalkey–Thompson transformations can be replaced by the Elmes and Reny (1994) trans-
formations, which preserve perfect recall (Kuhn 1953).
20 Why not consider convex combination of columns? Under the (Anscombe and Aumann 1963)
viewpoint, D’s payoffs are really expected payoffs over objective lotteries. It is then natural to say
thatD can mix over these lotteries – creating a row that is a convex combination of other rows. But
N does not mix.
21 If r is an admissible row in M, then it is optimal under some full-support measure q on the
columns of M. From q, define a full-support measure on the columns of , and argue that r is also
admissible in . Use the newmeasure to define a CPS on T. Argue that if r isn’t rational in T, given
this CPS, then it is inadmissible in .
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It is as if every time we think we finally get a hold on what rational behaviour means, we
find ourselves having grasped only a shadow. Maybe this means there is excessive υ´βρις
in this endeavour: that rationality is something belonging to the gods themselves, and that
should not be stolen from them. Maybe it is the tree of knowledge itself, that we should
not touch?
Perhaps the problem of inconsistent requirements says we are allowed to
know one thing – that rationality in its ‘ultimate form’ simply cannot be.
13 Knowledge-based approach
Throughout, we have focused on the epistemic literature that thinks of the
players in a game as having beliefs about one another’s strategies, beliefs about
these beliefs, etc. As pointed out right at the start in Example 4.1, these beliefs
don’t have to be correct in any sense. In general, a player’s type needn’t even
assign positive probability to the actual strategy-type pair of another player (or
have that pair in its support in the infinite case).
Knowledge as usually formalized is different from belief, in that if a player
knows an event E, then E indeed happens. Knowledge can be present in the
belief-based approach, in the form of observation. If his information set H is
reached, player i observes (and is correct) that the other players’ strategiesmust
be among those that allow H. These observations constitute the conditioning
events in aCPS (refer back to Sect. 6). In the strategic-formapproach, there is no
(non-trivial) knowledge, just the sequence of hypotheses that makes up an LPS.
Philosophically, the overall view is that only observables are knowable. Un-
observables are subject to belief, not knowledge. In particular, other players’
strategies are unobservables, and only moves are observables.
Another strand in the literature does allow knowledge about the strategies
chosen by other players. See, among others, Aumann (1995; 1998), Balkenborg
and Winter (1997), Halpern (1999; 2001), Samet (1996), Stalnaker (1996), and
also the exchange between Binmore (1996) and Aumann (1996).
There appear to be some connections between the belief-based and
knowledge-based approaches, but also significant differences. Counterfactu-
als play an important role in a knowledge-based analysis, if we want to talk
about what a player thinks at an information set that cannot be reached given
what he knows. There may be an analogy to the role of extended probabili-
ties in a belief-based analysis. But completeness is crucial to the belief-based
approach, as we have seen, and an analogous concept does not appear to be
present in the knowledge-based literature. Halpern (2001) is a good synthesis
of the knowledge-based approach.We are not aware of any formal treatment of
the relationship between this and the belief-based approach we have followed
in this survey.
Finally, we mention some papers that use formalisms related to, but again
different from, the ones we have covered. Feinberg (2005a;b) builds an exten-
sive-form epistemic framework. His approach is ‘local’ rather than ‘global,’
since, instead of a CPS, he specifies at each information set separately what a
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player believes there. Asheim and Perea (2005) is another epistemic analysis
on the tree, but uses the idea of a “conditional LPS” (Blume et al. 1991a, Defi-
nition 4.2) rather than CPS’s. (For each conditioning event E, take in sequence
all hypotheses that give E positive probability, calculate conditionals, and in
this way form an LPS concentrated on E.) Conceptually, conditional LPS’s are
the right object for epistemic analysis of “weak dominance on the tree”– as
opposed to “strong dominance on the tree,” which we noted earlier is what
comes from a CPS-based analysis.
14 Conclusion
The epistemic program can be viewed as a methodical construction of game
theory from its most basic elements – rationality and irrationality, belief (and
knowledge), belief about belief, etc. It is a ‘bottom-up’ approach. In this, it is
very different from the ‘top-down’ approach of the equilibrium refinements
program (as noted earlier). It is also very different in that Nash equilibrium has
played a much smaller role in the epistemic program. As we have seen, some
of the most basic questions lead naturally to other solution concepts.
We have talked about some seemingly inherent limits to the epistemic analy-
sis of games. Such limits aren’t a sign of failure. Rather, finding such theoretical
limits seems a sign that the epistemic program has reached a certain depth and
maturity. Also, several of the examples we looked at involved scenarios that
were ‘a long way from’ these theoretical limits. A big point of the epistemic pro-
gram is that there isn’t one right set of assumptions to make about a game. The
inconsistency of certain conditions is important, but not the whole picture. The
goal of the program is to be able to analyze many different sets of assumptions
about games in a precise and uniform manner.
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